Ancient Greek Metaphysics Aristotle

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case there need not be anything besides the contact, but in organic
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METAPHYSICS 53
unities there is something identical in both parts, which makes them
grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of
continuity and quantity, though not of quality.-(4) 'Nature' means
the primary material of which any natural object consists or out of
which it is made, which is relatively unshaped and cannot be changed
from its own potency, as e.g. bronze is said to be the nature of a
statue and of bronze utensils, and wood the nature of wooden things;
and so in all other cases; for when a product is made out of these
materials, the first matter is preserved throughout. For it is in
this way that people call the elements of natural objects also their
nature, some naming fire, others earth, others air, others water,
others something else of the sort, and some naming more than one of
these, and others all of them.-(5) 'Nature' means the essence of natural
objects, as with those who say the nature is the primary mode of composition,
or as Empedocles says:- "
"Nothing that is has a nature,
"But only mixing and parting of the mixed,
"And nature is but a name given them by men. "
Hence as regards the things that are or come to be by nature, though
that from which they naturally come to be or are is already present,
we say they have not their nature yet, unless they have their form
or shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature, e.g.
the animals and their parts; and not only is the first matter nature
(and this in two senses, either the first, counting from the thing,
or the first in general; e.g. in the case of works in bronze, bronze
is first with reference to them, but in general perhaps water is first,
if all things that can be melted are water), but also the form or
essence, which is the end of the process of becoming.-(6) By an extension
of meaning from this sense of 'nature' every essence in general has
come to be called a 'nature', because the nature of a thing is one
kind of essence.
"From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary
and strict sense is the essence of things which have in themselves,
as such, a source of movement; for the matter is called the nature
because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming
and growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding
from this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement
of natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially
or in complete reality.
Part 5 "
"We call 'necessary' (1, a) that without which, as a condition, a
thing cannot live; e.g. breathing and food are necessary for an animal;
for it is incapable of existing without these; (b) the conditions
without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which we cannot
get rid or be freed of evil; e.g. drinking the medicine is necessary
in order that we may be cured of disease, and a man's sailing to Aegina
is necessary in order that he may get his money.-(2) The compulsory
and compulsion, i.e. that which impedes and tends to hinder, contrary
to impulse and purpose. For the compulsory is called necessary (whence
the necessary is painful, as Evenus says: 'For every necessary thing
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METAPHYSICS 54
is ever irksome'), and compulsion is a form of necessity, as Sophocles
says: 'But force necessitates me to this act'. And necessity is held
to be something that cannot be persuaded-and rightly, for it is contrary
to the movement which accords with purpose and with reasoning.-(3)
We say that that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is.
And from this sense of 'necessary' all the others are somehow derived;
for a thing is said to do or suffer what is necessary in the sense
of compulsory, only when it cannot act according to its impulse because
of the compelling forces-which implies that necessity is that because
of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and similarly as regards the
conditions of life and of good; for when in the one case good, in
the other life and being, are not possible without certain conditions,
these are necessary, and this kind of cause is a sort of necessity.
Again, demonstration is a necessary thing because the conclusion cannot
be otherwise, if there has been demonstration in the unqualified sense;
and the causes of this necessity are the first premisses, i.e. the
fact that the propositions from which the syllogism proceeds cannot
be otherwise.
"Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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