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and the conquest of his provinces; but these two means are not exactly of the same import here as they would
be in reference to that object. If we attack the enemy's Army, it is a very different thing whether we intend to
follow up the first blow with a succession of others, until the whole force is destroyed, or whether we mean to
content ourselves with a victory to shake the enemy's feeling of security, to convince him of our superiority,
and to instil into him a feeling of apprehension about the future. If this is our object, we only go so far in the
destruction of his forces as is sufficient. In like manner, the conquest, of the enemy's provinces is quite a
different measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's Army. In the latter case the destruction of
the Army is the real effectual action, and the taking of the provinces only a consequence of it; to take them
before the Army had been defeated would always be looked upon only as a necessary evil. On the other hand,
if our views are not directed upon the complete destruction of the enemy's force, and if we are sure that the
enemy does not seek but fears to bring matters to a bloody decision, the taking possession of a weak or
defenceless province is an advantage in itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to make the
enemy apprehensive about the general result, then it may also be regarded as a shorter road to peace.
But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing the probability of the result without destroying the
enemy's Army, namely, upon the expeditions which have a direct connection with political views. If there are
any enterprises which are particularly likely to break up the enemy's alliances or make them inoperative, to
gain new alliances for ourselves, to raise political powers in our own favour, then it is easy to conceive how
much these may increase the probability of success, and become a shorter way towards our object than the
routing of the enemy's forces.
The second question is how to act upon the enemy's expenditure in strength, that is, to raise the price of
success.
The enemy's outlay in strength lies in the WEAR AND TEAR of his forces, consequently in the
DESTRUCTION of them on our part, and in the LOSS of PROVINCES, consequently the CONQUEST of
them by us.
Here, again, on account of the various significations of these means, so likewise it will be found that neither
of them will be identical in its signification in all cases if the objects are different. The smallness in general of
this difference must not cause us perplexity, for in reality the weakest motives, the finest shades of difference,
often decide in favour of this or that method of applying force. Our only business here is to show that, certain
conditions being supposed, the possibility of attaining our purpose in different ways is no contradiction,
absurdity, nor even error.
Besides these two means, there are three other peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy's
force. The first is INVASION, that is THE OCCUPATION OF THE ENEMY'S TERRITORY, NOT WITH
A VIEW TO KEEPING IT, but in order to levy contributions upon it, or to devastate it.
The immediate object here is neither the conquest of the enemy's territory nor the defeat of his armed force,
but merely to DO HIM DAMAGE IN A GENERAL WAY. The second way is to select for the object of our
enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than two
different directions in which our force may be employed, the first of which is to be preferred if our object is
CHAPTER II. END AND MEANS IN WAR 27
 On War
to defeat the enemy's Army, while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the
question. According to the usual mode of speaking, we should say that the first is primarily military, the other
more political. But if we take our view from the highest point, both are equally military, and neither the one
nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case. The third, by far the most important,
from the great number of cases which it embraces, is the WEARING OUT of the enemy. We choose this
expression not only to explain our meaning in few words, but because it represents the thing exactly, and is
not so figurative as may at first appear. The idea of wearing out in a struggle amounts in practice to A
GRADUAL EXHAUSTION OF THE PHYSICAL POWERS AND OF THE WILL BY THE LONG
CONTINUANCE OF EXERTION.
Now, if we want to overcome the enemy by the duration of the contest, we must content ourselves with as
small objects as possible, for it is in the nature of the thing that a great end requires a greater expenditure of
force than a small one; but the smallest object that we can propose to ourselves is simple passive resistance,
that is a combat without any positive view. In this way, therefore, our means attain their greatest relative
value, and therefore the result is best secured. How far now can this negative mode of proceeding be carried?
Plainly not to absolute passivity, for mere endurance would not be fighting; and the defensive is an activity
by which so much of the enemy's power must be destroyed that he must give up his object. That alone is what
we aim at in each single act, and therein consists the negative nature of our object.
No doubt this negative object in its single act is not so effective as the positive object in the same direction
would be, supposing it successful; but there is this difference in its favour, that it succeeds more easily than
the positive, and therefore it holds out greater certainty of success; what is wanting in the efficacy of its
single act must be gained through time, that is, through the duration of the contest, and therefore this negative
intention, which constitutes the principle of the pure defensive, is also the natural means of overcoming the
enemy by the duration of the combat, that is of wearing him out.
Here lies the origin of that difference of OFFENSIVE and DEFENSIVE, the influence of which prevails
throughout the whole province of War. We cannot at present pursue this subject further than to observe that
from this negative intention are to be deduced all the advantages and all the stronger forms of combat which
are on the side of the Defensive, and in which that philosophical-dynamic law which exists between the
greatness and the certainty of success is realised. We shall resume the consideration of all this hereafter.
If then the negative purpose, that is the concentration of all the means into a state of pure resistance, affords a
superiority in the contest, and if this advantage is sufficient to BALANCE whatever superiority in numbers
the adversary may have, then the mere DURATION of the contest will suffice gradually to bring the loss of
force on the part of the adversary to a point at which the political object can no longer be an equivalent, a
point at which, therefore, he must give up the contest. We see then that this class of means, the wearing out of
the enemy, includes the great number of cases in which the weaker resists the stronger.
Frederick the Great, during the Seven Years' War, was never strong enough to overthrow the Austrian
monarchy; and if he had tried to do so after the fashion of Charles the Twelfth, he would inevitably have had
to succumb himself. But after his skilful application of the system of husbanding his resources had shown the
powers allied against him, through a seven years' struggle, that the actual expenditure of strength far
exceeded what they had at first anticipated, they made peace.
We see then that there are many ways to one's object in War; that the complete subjugation of the enemy is [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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